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Swearing Attachment




This essay extends the remarks I made at the symposium, "Language,
Law, and Compulsion," but it tries to retain the style and spirit of my
oral delivery. Indeed I must retain that spirit if I am to practice what I
preach. This essay suggests that the rhetoric of formal academic discourse
and our experience of formal academic argument differ vastly from the
rhetorics and experiences which sustain everyday political communities.
We distort political processes and experiences badly simply by converting
them into academic rhetoric at all. For example, the processes that create
and sustain communities presumably do not depend on thorough footnot-
ing. The letter killeth, and so on. The very act of thinking and writing in
formal academic fashion about law, politics, and the humanities can blind
us to the poetic, musical, spiritual, and other mysterious aspects of human
bonding. I mean here to preserve some appreciation for the emotional and
nonrational qualities of political life that have traditionally concerned the
humanities precisely because they are central to our experience of commu-
nity itself. Hence I write without footnotes. Readers who prefer a more
conventionally academic treatment of these issues might consult the last
two decades of mainstream writings in ethnomusicology, beginning with
John Blacking's How Musical Is Man?, 1973.
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I
The organizers of the Symposium asked us-Sunstein, Levinson, Bos-
well, and myself-to wrestle with the following questions: How do oaths
of allegiance and other speech ceremonies serve to create and foster attach-
ments between self and other? How do we constitute communities through
words which bind? The oath of loyalty to a company of strangers and the
marriage vow to an intimate friend differ on almost every psychological
dimension imaginable. Nevertheless, my nutshell answer to both these
questions as they apply to nationality and marriage is the same: Speech
ceremonies and words that bind are, in the grand scheme of things, not
very central to the constitution of intimate attachments or of communities.
Professor Owen Fiss unknowingly provided material that helps direct
my argument when, on page 42 of its September 29, 1986, issue, the edi-
tors of The New Republic published Fiss's letter critical of Edward Roth-
stein's essay on the late pianist Glenn Gould:
Edward Rothstein is looking for something, but not in the right
places ("Making-Believe Crazy," August 25). I suggest that he at-
tend a Stevie Wonder concert, which I was fortunate enough to do
the other night (thanks to my daughter). Stevie Wonder did not rein-
force aristocratic values, but somehow managed to transform the au-
dience into a community that cut across class, age, sexual, and racial
lines, and to give to that community a life and a beat. The music
that we heard was available on tape, but the performance was not.
We were reminded that Stevie Wonder is blind and black, and one
of the musical geniuses of our age; he is male, but wore his hair and
clothing in a way that universalized his appearance; he was encased
in electronic gadgetry, but spoke only of love; and he used his hold
over the audience to address the highest issues of state and to de-
nounce apartheid. Stevie Wonder is the "communal myth" that
Rothstein seeks, but it is the myth of a democracy.
I find two competing models of community-making implicit in this letter.
The first model posits that community depends on some common alle-
giance to or acceptance of an idea, in this case the idea of an inclusive
democracy. Stevie Wonder addressed the highest matters of state, both in
his words-his denunciation of apartheid-and in his body language. His
performance persuaded us that we can live out a vision of social equality
and dignity. In the second model, community depends on the experience of
a powerful coherence in a moment. In this model, it is not the vision of
democratic theory that makes the community (except, perhaps, for a few
abnormally educated people like readers of this journal). Rather, the com-
munity is the experience of shared sounds and symbols that have truth
value within the culture. If, as I believe, this second model better approxi-
mates the politics of community-making, then ceremonies and words can
[Vol. 2: 93
2
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol2/iss1/6
Carter
bind only if they repeat the experience of sharing truthful sounds and
symbols. Taking an oath of naturalization or of marital fidelity thus can-
not carry the same political load as do, say, the ritual songs and dances
that John Blacking's How Musical Is Man? describes.
But let me back away from this rather dogmatic and perhaps simplistic
opening. My real mission here is to provoke conversations that help us
attach to each other. I hope to distinguish more promising from less prom-
ising paths, and I mean to begin by suggesting that the conventional wis-
dom about oaths leads to dead ends and symptomatizes a serious flaw in
the habits of contemporary academic discourse, at least in my field of the
social sciences. By conventional wisdom I mean, for example, the assump-
tion that if X takes an oath, X's behavior is more likely to comply with
the behavior the oath commands, all other things being equal, than if X
did not take the oath. Therefore, the greater the proportion of community
members who take a common oath, the more uniformly community mem-
bers will believe certain values and behave accordingly. I reject such a
formulation, with its intentional parody of contemporary social scientific
language. I also mean to reject a somewhat more plausible formulation,
namely that the experience of sharing the promise, of taking the oath in a
ceremony shared by strangers, increases one's commitment to live either
by the oath's words or by other rules and decisions the community
imposes.
I'm not going to belabor the obvious methodological difficulties in test-
ing such conventional social science assumptions about attachment cere-
monies except to note that all other things are never equal and that when
interpretive disagreements about an oath's meaning arise, we lose our
measure of compliance. Indeed, scholars won't agree on how to interpret
interpretive disagreements. Suppose the disagreement on the following two
interpretive questions: Does the emotional death of a marriage count as
"till death do us part"? Just what are the limits of George Bush's ability?
Would the existence of such disagreements indicate that the oath in each
of these cases has failed by failing to constitute a common language effec-
tively? What of the converse? Since language is inevitably imprecise,
would our very willingness to invest in resolving a textual disagreement
mean that we are already attached and well-constituted?
Pulling one step back from the folly of positivistic social measurement,
we might take either of two more theoretical paths, either a homo
economicus rational-man or a Freudian (or William Barrett) irrational-
man path. Both are appealing. Maybe we live our lives as a more or less
continuous series of cost-benefit calculations. The impact of the one-time
taking of an oath is inevitably trivial. What matters is the extent to which
the expectations the oath creates make violation more costly than compli-
ance-and this in turn is a function not of taking the oath but of living in
a community, a church, a marriage, a polity, that values the substance of
1990]
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the oath, a value which we learn not by taking the oath but by seeing
violations consistently punished. Even if school children repeat it nearly as
often as they brush their teeth, the Pledge of Allegiance would not bind
unless children consistently experience the benefits and costs of taking it
seriously. Conversely, on the Freudian path, we are driven by our feel-
ings. Oaths as formal commands, or simply as messages, lack the psychic
strength to overcome the powers of anger, love, hunger, friendship, and so
forth.
I don't intend to pursue either rational or irrational man models. In
fact, I can't distinguish them in my own experience. The following story
seems to me to confirm that the two inevitably blend. My oldest child was
married last New Year's Eve. Friends and relatives from around the
country gathered in Athens, and my wife and I got pretty frantic arrang-
ing meals, flowers, music, hotel reservations, and the like. At one point my
wife declared, with a hint of hysteria in her voice, that she would pay the
kids to elope if it weren't for the fact that all the effort and all the cere-
mony would make them realize the seriousness of the oaths they were
about to take. Her brother, a social psychologist, said no, the reasons for
the ceremony were completely different. Studies show, he said, that the
slopes of the approach curve and the avoidance curve, in standard ap-
proach/avoidance psychology, differ. The approach curve starts sooner
but rises at a lower slope. The avoidance curve rises faster but starts later,
so that its height surpasses the approach curve just shortly before the
stressful event. Ceremonies like weddings are designed to raise tempora-
rily the costs of avoidance, to raise the costs of backing out because other-
wise people would back out far too often.
So, wedding ceremonies are a cleverly rational social response to a
problem created by our individual irrationality. The ceremony does not
make words more meaningful and binding. The ceremony is part of a
larger, and often coercive, cost-benefit package that society imposes be-
cause we are, individually, often so incapable of action that is rational
beyond the moment.
II
But recall that so far I've tried only to describe some paths I advise
against taking. My main argument for rejecting these paths goes like this:
Communities and attachments are not constituted in a "one-shot" sense at
all. They are acts of continuous creation, not big bangs. Taking an oath
once is no more helpful than taking oat bran once to reduce cholesterol
levels. Yet the very questions I started with, questions which this panel
was asked to address-How do speech ceremonies serve to create and fos-
ter attachments? How do we constitute through words which
bind?-imply that a "shot" of text, of oath or constitution, can make a
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community. These questions can only arise from an understanding of law,
language, and human nature that I believe is wrong. Robert Penn Warren
hinted at the error on pages 54-55 of his Democracy and Poetry (1975):
[A]s Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to his daughter Martha, re-
marked, Americans felt that any difficulty could be surmounted by
"resolution" and "contrivance"-and this remained as true of the
last man off the boat at Ellis Island as of the first settler at James-
town. But the success that rewarded our resolution and contrivance
led us, bit by bit, to believe that solutions would be almost automatic:
pass a law, take a poll, draw up a budget, make a body count, hire
an expert or PR man, believe only optimistic reports.
Is there not some functionalistic premise quite deep, both in conventional
liberal philosophy and in our political and legal culture, which says in
effect that oaths matter, that the Constitution matters, that marriage vows
matter only because such contrivances solve problems?
My argument thus far threatens academic conventions. If we constitute
communities less through analytical judgments than through poetically ex-
periential processes, academic analysis may inevitably distort political re-
ality beyond recognition. To ward off that conclusion I want to suggest
three not entirely compatible alternative paths that may connect oaths and
attachment ceremonies, though not very powerfully, to this process of con-
tinuous constitution of communities.
In the first of these, public language of all sorts-legal, religious, politi-
cal, commercial, and so on-does not create community by declaring the
norms and values we agree to live by nor does such language impose an
artificial but necessary common understanding of life's inherent chaos. It
matters because its familiar and predictable repetitions are themselves the
individual's experience of community. We don't consciously confirm at-
tachments as much as we experience being attached. How we experience
that is a mystery which academics will not successfully explain. It is in
this view the very mysteriousness of the covenantal experience, as opposed
to the contractual one, that binds. Repeating the Mass in Latin did con-
tinuously constitute communities that spoke no Latin. Martin Buber made
the same point when he down-played the difference between natural and
supernatural explanations of the events in the Exodus:
It is irrelevant whether "much" or "little," unusual things or usual,
tremendous or trifling events happened; what is vital is only that
what happened was experienced . . . as the act of God. The people
saw in whatever it was they saw "the great hand," and they "be-
lieved in Yahweh". . . . From the biblical viewpoint history always
contains the element of wonder. (Moses, 1946, pp. 77, 79.)
The second alternative draws from the new pragmatism of Richard
1990]
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Rorty and its legal analog in the law and literature work of James Boyd
White. In this thoroughly discursive model of politics, a legal provision,
an oath, or a vow can be no more than a conversational stimulant. Just as
conversations about oat bran tell us less about the inherent properties of
oat bran than about the value of individualism and the degree of self-
consciousness in our polity, so political and legal conversations matter for
reasons quite apart from the conclusions the arguments claim to reach.
Communities are constituted by communal talk, and if (for whatever rea-
sons) we take oaths seriously, our efforts to talk to one another about
them will constitute us. Experience and conversation constitute us. Our
talk about common experiences, about marriages, about Meryl Streep's or
Dustin Hoffman's latest film, or the Super Bowl, or why the last presi-
dential campaign was so disturbing, bind marriages and polities more
tightly than do presidential, marital, or naturalization oaths. On this view,
the presidential oath of office, for example, helps to constitute us only in
circumstances like Watergate, when it helps us sharpen the debate over an
issue like Richard Nixon's impeachment.
This second alternative for understanding the constituting power of
words that bind assumes that we are moving from a liberal contractarian
paradigm to a discursive paradigm. The third alternative moves from the
liberal paradigm toward what I can only call a hopefulness paradigm.
Public language of all sorts seeks to maintain the meaningfulness of asso-
ciating with a group by reconfirming the trustworthiness and virtue of the
individuals in it, and especially the virtue of group leaders. L. H. LaRue
in his superb book on Watergate (Political Discourse, 1988) has stated
that the most fundamental political question we can ask of one another is
"Do you really mean what you have said?" The oath is a way of saying,
"Yes, I really mean it," but the desirable consequence is not that one then
must comply in the future but that trust is created in the moment. But if
this is the key to creating trust and the common experience of virtue, then
oaths have no special or unique political importance or power to make
communities. At least this seems to have been former Senator John
Tower's theory of politics when he defended his nomination to be George
Bush's Secretary of Defense in 1989. On Sunday, February 26, he stated
that he had never broken an oath or pledge. On March 1 before the Na-
tional Press Club he asserted that he had broken marriage vows and that
he suspected he was not alone. Tower seemed to strive for creating believ-
ability in the moment, and apparently neglected the capacity of videotape
to run both comments side by side in a future moment.
The static, contractual character of oaths may further diminish their
significance if we posit that maintaining enthusiasm for and trust in a
spouse or a political leader or a community depends on creativity, on the
hope that continued association will create something new. What if the
continuously creative character of relationships is obvious to nearly all but
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academicians who make a living attacking or defending liberalism? Per-
haps virtue, courage, discipline and hence attachment are reconfirmed
most directly by grappling with the possibility of changing the existing
order in more hopeful directions. I suspect it is this hopefulness, not the
commitment to specific biblical commands, which sustains the evangelical
community. Perhaps the constitutional bicentennial should therefore have
celebrated what Will Harris called the "sovereign power to make things
over," a point which seems largely to have escaped the bicentennial
commission.
We have at our disposal a few experiential tests of such a model. We
might ask why we particularly admire a Justice, like the second Harlan,
or a scholar, perhaps Ronald Dworkin, without agreeing with them. If we
do, it may be because the coherence of their creative performances en-
hances our commitment to an enterprise we share with them. I believe
they really mean what they say. And they seek to create something new. I
speak here of what Michael Moore has called a coherence standard and
which I in the past have called an aesthetic standard. If we test virtue and
integrity through the experience that our actions and beliefs cohere over
time, then the most an oath can do is help limit and frame what needs to
cohere.
Conversely, the sorry state of debate in the 1988 presidential election
campaign seems, at least to me, to be almost purely a function of my
inability to believe that either candidate really meant anything. Bush's
election victory seems best understood not in terms of policy preferences
but in the lesser incoherence in the messages, verbal and non-verbal, that
he sent. Neither the fact nor the ceremony of his taking the inaugural
oath changes my expectations for his presidency, any more than my son's
and daughter-in-law's oath-taking in their marriage service changes my
expectations for their future.
III
How, finally, might my remarks apply to this occasion? Most obvi-
ously, whether this conference will further strengthen a community of
scholars will not depend on whether we take an oath or whether we agree
with one another but on whether we trust each other to mean what we
say. Somewhat less obviously, I hope my remarks have at least hinted at
the importance of a first-class journal connecting law and the humanities,
for the humanities have never taken liberalism's model of political or in-
terpersonal attachment very seriously. If we need models that we can
more deeply trust, I have no doubt they will come from an increasing
appreciation of the mythopoetic quality of life, one in which, as Wagner's
"Die Meistersinger von Nirnberg" so charmingly shows, tradition and
change depend equally on demonstrations of public virtue that we achieve
1990]
7
Carter: Oath Bran; or, Law, Politics, and Allegiance
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1990
100 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 2: 93
only through what we commonly call "art." Attachment ceremonies are,
of course, art forms, but I'm reluctant to destroy the mystery of art by
explaining it. The best we can do is strive to repeat the wonder we expe-
rience in connecting. Indeed, Harold Berman's description, in Law and
Revolution, of law in the late middle ages in Germany may come close to
the mark: "Law was conceived primarily as an expression of the uncon-
scious mind of the people . . . , rather than primarily as a deliberate
expression of conscious reason or will. It was, in that respect, like art, like
myth, like language itself" (p. 68). The greatest good this new journal can
do is to help teach us to keep alive our appreciation for our aesthetic
wonder at the core of community life.
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